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The process of designing artifacts is a creative activity. It is proposed that, at the
cognitive level, one key to understanding design creativity is to understand the array
of symbol systems designers utilize. These symbol systems range from being vague,
imprecise, abstract, ambiguous, and indeterminate (like conceptual sketches), to being
very precise, concrete, unambiguous, and determinate (like contract documents). The
former types of symbol systems support associative processes that facilitate lateral (or
divergent) transformations that broaden the problem space, while the latter types of symbol
systems support inference processes facilitating vertical (or convergent) transformations
that deepen of the problem space. The process of artifact design requires the judicious
application of both lateral and vertical transformations. This leads to a dual mechanism
model of design problem-solving comprising of an associative engine and an inference
engine. It is further claimed that this dual mechanism model is supported by an interesting
hemispheric dissociation in human prefrontal cortex. The associative engine and neural
structures that support imprecise, ambiguous, abstract, indeterminate representations are
lateralized in the right prefrontal cortex, while the inference engine and neural structures
that support precise, unambiguous, determinant representations are lateralized in the left
prefrontal cortex. At the brain level, successful design of artifacts requires a delicate balance
between the two hemispheres of prefrontal cortex.
Keywords: architecture, creativity, drawing, representations, cognition, neuropsychology, lesion studies,
hemispheric asymmetry
INTRODUCTION
The central problem of designing and creating artifacts can
perhaps be captured in the example in Figure 1. A young archi-
tect, Jorn Utzon, is confronted with the problem of designing
an opera house for a site in Sydney, Australia and generates
the drawings for specifying the artifact depicted in Figure 1.
No other animal is capable of doing this. The question of
interest is what cognitive and neurological processes make it
possible?
There are at least two popular accounts of how this act of cre-
ation comes about. The ﬁrst is the ex nihilo account from Genesis.
“And God said let there be light...” (or an opera house) and it was
thus. It is a simple, straightforward account with broad appeal.
Throughout literature poets and artists have been invoking Gods
to inspire their works, as does Homer in the ﬁrst few lines of the
Iliad (“Mênin aeide, thea, Pêlêiadeô Achillêos....”). The only prob-
lem is that one needs to be a God (or at least inspired by God)
to create ex nihilo. Presumably, this route was not available to
Utzon.
The second account ismore earthly. It is a process of combining
existing ideas and concepts in a manner useful for an intended
purpose (Koestler, 1975). On this “select and combine” account,
Utzon does not begin with a blank slate. He has considerable
knowledge about the world, including opera houses. All he has to
do is to select and modify existing structures to suit his speciﬁc
conditions. Indeed, in his retrospective account of the process he
notes being inspired by memories of the Castle of Kornborg, the
Yucatán Peninsula in Mexico, and seeing the naval charts over
Sydney1.
This latter view of creation is endorsed by many. For exam-
ple, Wittgenstein (1993, p. 228) noted that “problems are solved,
not by giving new information, but by arranging what we have
known since long.” More recently, Steve Jobs stated “creativity is
just connecting things. When we ask creative people how they did
something, they feel a little guilty because they did not really do it,
they just saw something. It seemed obvious to them after a while.
That’s because they were able to connect experiences they’ve had
and synthesize new things. And the reason theywere able to do that
was that they’ve had more experiences than other people2.” I think
this viewpoint, at best, begs several critical questions. If nothing
else, it demonstrates that being creative does not necessarily give
one insight into the process of creativity.
For example, confronted with the same task as Utzon, I might,
following the select-and-combinemodel proceed as follows: I have
some knowledge of the world and existing opera houses. I also
know that the site of the proposed opera house is on the har-
bor. So perhaps I can select elements from existing opera houses
and combine them with elements from nautical themes. (There
is certainly a deeply entrenched story within the architecture
community about how Utzon came up with the basic idea by
1http://www.utzonoperahouse.com/memories.php
2http://www.informationweek.com/it-leadership/steve-jobs-11-acts-of-vision/d/
d-id/1100596
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FIGURE 1 |The input to the designer is a design brief, the output are the contract documents specifying the artifact.The problem of interest is what
cognitive and neurological structures and processes support the transformation of the input to the output.
watching and drawing sailboats in the harbor.) I could start with
the famous opera house in Vienna and a sailboat, and combine
them as in Figure 2. In doing so, I’m proceeding as prescribed by
the select-and-combine model of creativity.
However, the ludicrous result, depicted in Figure 2, high-
lights two critical shortcomings of the select-and-combine model.
The ﬁrst issue is one of determining relevant or salient features
and elements from irrelevant or non-salient features and ele-
ments. The second issue is that the selection and combination
of features and elements requires abstraction and modiﬁcation.
They cannot simply be cut and pasted from one context to
another. The ﬁrst problem is an instance of the ubiquitous
problem of induction, often known as the “Frame Problem” in
the cognitive science literature. It is pervasive throughout cog-
nitive psychology and is present in the framework developed
here. The main focus of this article is to present some ideas
for dealing with the second issue in the context of architectural
design.
There is a literature in cognitive psychology that focuses on cre-
ativity. I will begin by suggesting that this literature, while relevant,
misses the mark, or is at least incomplete, in terms of understand-
ing creativity in the design process. An underlying theme of the
article is that creativity is probably not a unitary concept to be
identiﬁed and exposed. It is more likely a byproduct of real-world
problem-solving, as suggested by the select-and-combine model
of creativity (see alsoWeisberg, 1993). I will suggest that one key to
understandingdesign creativity is to appreciate the array of symbol
systems designers utilize. These symbol systems range from being
vague, imprecise, abstract, ambiguous, and indeterminate (like
conceptual sketches) to being very precise, concrete, unambigu-
ous, and determinate (like contract documents3). These symbol
systems are essential in allowing for the abstractions andmodiﬁca-
tions required by the select-and-combine model of creativity. The
former types of symbol systems support associative mechanisms
facilitating lateral (or divergent) transformations that broaden
the problem space, while the latter types of symbol systems sup-
port inference mechanisms that facilitate vertical (or convergent)
transformations that deepen the problem space (Goel, 1995). This
results in a dual or multiple mechanism model of problem solving,
not unlike that proposed by Sloman (1996) for logical reasoning.
These two systems work together in successful design problem
solving. Furthermore, there is evidence of hemispheric dissoci-
ations in prefrontal cortex (PFC) corresponding to the different
cognitive representations and mechanisms. The last section will
present evidence that the right PFC tolerates imprecise, ambigu-
ous, abstract, indeterminate representations, and is more suited
for lateral transformations while the left PFC supports precise,
3The term “contract documents” refers to the ﬁnal technical drawings (i.e.,
blueprints) and accompanying linguistic speciﬁcations that specify the artifact to
be constructed.
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FIGURE 2 |The select-and-combine model of creativity.The above selection and combination are consistent with the select-and-combine model, and serve
to highlight its inadequacy.
unambiguous, determinant representations, and facilitates vertical
transformations.
RELATING THE COGNITIVE CREATIVITY LITERATURE TO THE
DESIGN PROCESS
There is a large cognitive psychology literature on creativity
(Barron and Harrington, 1981; Hocevar, 1981; Sternberg, 1999;
Jung-Beeman, 2005; Vartanian, 2009; Kaufman and Sternberg,
2010). But, the constraints of experimental design largely pre-
clude studies embedded in real world contexts, such as design
problem-solving (though see Mansﬁeld and Busse, 1981; Gard-
ner, 1982; Weisberg, 2011). [There is a literature on design
creativity within the design and engineering disciplines (Gero
and Maher, 1993; Dorst and Cross, 2001; Goldschmidt and
Tatsa, 2005), but it lies beyond the scope of this review].
Creativity-related research in cognitive psychology seems to have
two primary foci. One focus is the literature on insight/“aha”
problems; the second is the literature on divergent thinking
tasks.
INSIGHT PROBLEMS
Examples of insight problems include the candlestick problem,
triangle problem, and the radiation problem, among others
(Katona, 1940; Duncker, 1945). These types of problems are
widely characterized by an impasse (no obvious solution), ﬁxation
(repetition of the same types of unsuccessful steps), incubation
(disengagement of the problem), and a sudden solution (“aha”
experience; Duncker, 1945).
Consider the triangle problem task in Figure 3. The task
is to arrange six sticks of equal length (Figure 3A) to form
four equilateral triangles. Most participants look for a solution
within a two-dimensional problem space (Figure 3B). Four tri-
angles can indeed be formed in this manner, but they will not
be equilateral triangles. The problem has no two-dimensional
solution. There is nothing about the problem constraints that
speciﬁes a two dimensional solution. It seems to be an implicit,
self imposed constraint. However, once participants suppress or
relax this constraint and explore three-dimensional representa-
tions of the problem, the solution presents itself (Figure 3C).
Interestingly, the 3D space provides exponentially more possibil-
ities for arranging the six sticks, but nonetheless, the solution
seems fairly obviously, perhaps restricted by the affordances of the
problem.
Most insight problems are quite removed from design prob-
lems in that they are a special subset of well-structured problems
(Reitman, 1964; Goel, 1995). While there is much to be said
about the relationship between well-structured and ill-structured
problems (Goel, 1995), here I will focus on two points: (1)
well-structured problems have completely speciﬁed start states,
goal states, and transformation functions that map the former
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org April 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 241 | 3
Goel Creative brains: designing in the real world
FIGURE 3 |The triangle problem (Katona, 1940).The goal of the task is to
arrange six sticks of equal length (A) into four equilateral triangles.
(B)While one can form four triangles in two-dimensional space, they will
not be equilateral. (C) Once the third dimension is considered, the solution
presents itself.
onto the latter whilst these critical components in ill-structured
problems are incompletely speciﬁed (Reitman, 1964); and (2)
the constraints of well-structured problems are constitutive of
the task while the constraints on ill-structured problems are
ﬂexible and negotiable (Goel, 1995). Real-world problems (like
design problems) have both, ill-structured and well-structured
components.
As the triangle problem is a well-structured problem, it is rela-
tively easy to specify a problem space. The start state in the triangle
problem is completely and unambiguously characterized by the
given six sticks of equal length (Figure 3A). The goal state is to
arrange them in four equilateral triangles. The transformation
function is also speciﬁed and on the surface seems trivial – rear-
range the sticks. The task is to apply this transformation function
in a generate-and-evaluate cycle to comeupwith a pattern that sat-
isﬁes the goal state. The task, despite being well-structured, may,
of course, be non-trivial.
Insight problems differ from the broader class of well-
structured problems in that the goal state lies in a part of the
problem space that is unconnected (or remotely connected) to, or
not“visible” from the current state of the problem solver. The phe-
nomenological experience of the problem solver is one of being
suddenly transferred from the current node in the problem space
to a node that is connected to or near the goal state. Once this
mental set shift or reconceptualization occurs, the problem solver
can access the goal state using standard “convergent thinking”
processes.
DIVERGENT THINKING OR SEMANTIC SPREAD TASKS
Divergent thinking or semantic spread tasks are the second widely
used class of creativity tasks in the cognitive psychology literature.
The Alternative Uses Task (Guilford, 1967) provides a good exam-
ple of such problems. The goal in the Alternative Uses Task is to
generate as many uses as possible of familiar objects (e.g., hammer,
stapler, rock, etc.). It is argued that success in this task is a function
of “defocused” attention (Vartanian, 2009). The more defocused
a subject’s attention, the more widely dispersed connections they
will make.
This category of tasks differ from insight problems in at least
three important ways: (i) they are a subset of ill-structured prob-
lems; (ii) they involve continuous divergent transformations (as
opposed to a discreet mental set shift, followed by convergent
transformations); (iii) there is no sudden “aha” experience asso-
ciated with discovery of the goal state. Solutions are gradually
developed4.
COGNITIVE THEORIES OF CREATIVITY
In terms of cognitive theories of creativity, there are two, slightly
different accounts. On one account, represented by the works of
Kaplan and Simon (1990), Ormerod et al. (2002), and Ward et al.
(1998), there is nothing special about creativity. Creativity tasks
simply place differential demands on memory and attentional
systems.
The second account, directed at insight problems, as pre-
sented by Ohlsson (1992) and Öllinger and Knoblich (2009)
focuses on representational change through chunk decomposi-
tion and/or constraint relaxation. They hold that people make
implicit assumptions based upon properties of the representation
of the problem, that in turn hamper solutions. An example is pro-
vided by the triangle problem in Figure 3. Participants assume
a two-dimensional solution space, even though nothing in the
problem statement requires this. As already noted, the problem
has no two-dimensional solution. However, once participants
form a three-dimensional representation of the problem space,
the solution “presents itself.” On both accounts creativity tasks
are accommodated within the standard cognitive information
processing theory framework (Newell and Simon, 1972).
My concern is with accounting for creativity within the archi-
tectural design process. I will also argue for the critical importance
of representational change. However, the account I will advo-
cate differs from both of these accounts in that the type of
representational change that I believe is required for real-world
problem solving necessitates the use of a wide range of quali-
tatively different symbol systems, whereas, the examples in this
literature always involve a transformation within the same sym-
bol system (Goel, 1995). As many symbol systems result in
vague, ambiguous, indeterminate representations, they lie beyond
standard information processing theory models of cognition
(Goel, 1995).
LIMITATIONS OF THE CREATIVITY LITERATURE IN UNDERSTANDING
DESIGN ACTIVITY
I want to suggest that a focus on insight problems and divergent
thinking problems, while capturing genuine issues in terms of cre-
ativity, may not be particularly germane or central to our problem
4This is not to suggest that insight problems and divergent thinking problems are
necessarily mutually exclusive. For example, the Remote Associates Task was devel-
oped by Mednick (1962) as a divergent thinking task. A number of researchers
believe that it alsohas an insight component anduse it as a insight task (Jung-Beeman
et al., 2004).
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of understanding creativity in the real world context of designing
artifacts.
There are two important sources of discontinuity between clas-
sic insight problems and real world design problems. First, the
designof artifacts has both ill-structured andwell-structured com-
ponents, while insight problems are usually well-structured. This
has enormous consequences for the structure of the problem space
(Goel, 1995). Second, while there may have been a eureka moment
on Utzon’s route to the design of the opera house, the design cer-
tainly did not emerge, fully formed. The basic idea would have
evolved over a period of days to months.
There may be a more natural connection between diver-
gent thinking tasks and the design of artifacts, but even here
the connection is incomplete. A defocused mind, on its own,
is not a productive mind. While divergent thinking (or mak-
ing connections between widely dispersed concepts) is critical
for design, it is not sufﬁcient. Design also requires convergent
thinking. For example, while “hammering a nail”may be one pos-
sible use of a rock, in actuality it may not be practical/suitable
unless it is shaped in a certain way or fastened to a handle,
etc.
The value of the cognitive creativity literature is to highlight
the importance of divergent/lateral transformation (defocused
attention) mechanisms and representational change as neces-
sary components of creativity. It’s shortcomings are (1) ignoring
the equally important role of convergent/vertical transforma-
tions in real-world creativity tasks; (2) ignoring the distinc-
tion between well-structured and ill-structured problems, and
(3) not appreciating the critical role of the structure of sym-
bol systems in facilitating divergent and convergent transfor-
mations. The next section expands on these three themes
and endorses a dual mechanism model of design problem-
solving.
COGNITIVE CHARACTERIZATION OF THE DESIGN PROCESS
This analysis begins bymaking two common assumptions (Chom-
sky, 1975; Fodor, 1975; Newell, 1980): (i) that all thought processes
are goal directed transformations of mental representations; (ii) an
analysis of the structure of external representations used by prob-
lem solvers gives us an insight into the structure of their internal
mental representations and transformations. These assumptions
commit us to a central role for representations and restrict the
space of explanations. Within this framework we can appeal to
representational structures and the (computational) procedures
that transform the representations5. The two are, of course, not
unrelated. Every representational structure will facilitate certain
types of transformations/computations and hinder others. For
example, list-type data structures facilitate the computation of
certain functions (e.g., sorting a list of items), while matrices-type
data structures facilitate the computation of other functions (e.g.,
image processing).
Design problem-solving is typically characterized as a multi-
step process involving problem scoping/framing, generation of
preliminary ideas, reﬁnement, and detailing. Each phase differs
with respect to the type of information dealt with, the degree of
commitment to generated ideas, the level of detail attended to,
the number and types of transformations engaged in, the mental
representations needed to support the different types of informa-
tion and transformations, and the corresponding computational
mechanism (Goel, 1995). As one progresses from the prelimi-
nary phases to the detailing phases, the problem becomes more
structured. This is depicted in Figure 4.
Problem scoping/framing is the process of interpretation of an
open-ended problem statement in the context of the designer’s
5There are also, of course, assumptions (explicit or implicit) about the cogni-
tive/computational architecture.
FIGURE 4 | Aspects of design problem solving. Unlike the state space for
well-structured problems, the state space for ill-structured, real-world
problems must support different problem-solving phases, which need to be
supported by different representational systems, cognitive processes, and
computational mechanisms. PSS-type and non-PSS-type indicate physical
symbol system type mechanisms (Newell, 1980) and non-physical symbol
system type mechanisms, respectively. A strict dichotomy of representational
systems and processes is not intended. The intention is to convey a spectrum
of representational systems (and processes) along the dimension of
indeterminate and determinate.
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world knowledge, goals, aspirations, abilities, resources, etc. The
initial framing of the problem is a function of this poorly under-
stood interpretation process rather than the original problem
statement.
Preliminary solution generation is a classic case of creative
problem solving. It is a phase of “cognitive way-ﬁnding”, a
phase of concept construction, where a few kernel ideas are
generated and explored through lateral transformations. A lat-
eral transformation is one where movement is from one idea
to a slightly different idea rather than a more detailed ver-
sion of the same idea. Lateral transformations are necessary
for the widening of the problem space and the exploration
and development of kernel ideas. This generation and explo-
ration of ideas/concepts is facilitated by the abstract nature of
information being considered, a low degree of commitment to
generated ideas, the coarseness of detail, and the number of lateral
transformations.
The reﬁnement and detailing phases are more constrained and
structured. They are phases where preconstructed concepts are
manipulated. Commitments are made to a particular solution and
propagated through the problem space. They are characterized by
the concrete nature of information being considered, a high degree
of commitment to generated ideas, attention to detail, and a large
number of vertical transformations. A vertical transformation is
onewheremovement is fromone idea to amore detailed version of
the same idea. It results in a deepening of the problem space. The
rules underlying vertical transformations can often be articulated
(Goel, 1995).
The ability to engage in lateral transformations is underwritten
by a mechanism that supports ill-structured mental represen-
tations. Ill-structured representations are imprecise, ambigu-
ous, ﬂuid, indeterminate, vague, etc. The ability to engage
in vertical transformations is underwritten by a mechanism
that supports well-structured mental representations and com-
putation. Well-structured representations are precise, distinct,
determinate, and unambiguous. It has been further argued
that there is a computational dissociation between these two
mechanisms (Goel, 1995; Giunti, 1997). Ill-structured and well-
structured representations differ with respect to formal properties.
This in turn affects the modes of inference they can partici-
pate in and the computational mechanisms required to support
them.
Figure 5 depicts a highly incomplete and speculative recon-
struction of Utzon’s problem space. The start state is the design
brief. The goal state is something as vague as “design an Opera
House for this site on the Sydney Harbor. . ..” The intermittent
states (incomplete) are the depicted drawings, the outcomes of
transformations from the design brief to the preliminary sketches,
through reﬁnement, to the detailed drawings. Unlike the case of
the triangle problem task (Figure 3), the task here is not one of dis-
covering a path from a start state to a goal state in a problem space
speciﬁed by given constraints. The problem space does not come
prespeciﬁed. It must be constructed on route. In fact, it can be
argued that the speciﬁcation of the problem space is the problem
(Rittel and Webber, 1974). While I will continue to use the term
“problem space” in the context of design (for the lack of a better
term), it should be clear that I believe that there is a discontinuity
in the meaning of this term in the context of the triangle prob-
lem task (well-structured problem) and a design task (real-world
problem). The reader is referred to Simon (1973) for a contrary
view.
Our present focus is on the nature of the representations and
transformations that we ﬁnd in the designer’s problem space, and
how they evolve over time.
Thedesignbrief is a natural languagedocument. It has a reason-
ably “precise” meaning but clearly allows for enormous latitude,
multiple interpretations, and negotiation (i.e., the constraints it
provides are not constitutive of the task). This can be seen in the
fact that any three different architects would interpret the design
brief in three different ways and generate three different start states
(to say nothing of the actual design/artifact).
The initial drawings made by designers are much less pre-
cise and much more abstract than the actual design brief. They
are indeterminate, vague, and ambiguous. In fact, there need
not be any fact of the matter as to what they represent. Does
Figure 5D depict a sailboat, copulating turtles, stacked plates? All
of the above? None of the above? The situation that designers
ﬁnd themselves in here is not unlike Wittgenstein’s (1993, p.193)
philosophers who like little children “ﬁrst scribble random lines
on a piece of paper with their pencils, and now ask an adult ‘What
is that?’.” The “what is that” is often discovered and emerges from
the conceptual drawings after the fact.
As the designer moves from these preliminary/conceptual
drawings to more detailed drawings (Figures 5E,F), the indeter-
minacy and ambiguity begin to dissipate. (This will rarely be a
linear process. The designer will reiterate between indeterminate
and determinate representations several times.) By the time the
ﬁnal drawings are generated (Figures 5G,H), the representation
of the artifact is determinate. There is now a one-to-one mapping
between the representations (drawings and speciﬁcations) and the
to-be-constructed artifact.
This process of moving from an ill-deﬁned scenario to more
abstract, indeterminate representations and then back to more
determinate representations is depicted in Figure 5. We might
summarize the relationship between the design brief, preliminary
sketches, and contract documents as follows: contract drawings
are determinate and allow for the representation of articulate,
precise, concrete, and unambiguous informational states. Concep-
tual sketches are indeterminate and allow for the representation
of vague, inarticulate, imprecise, abstract, and ambiguous infor-
mational states. Design briefs fall somewhere between these two
extremes.
Not only do designers use several different types of symbol
systems, we ﬁnd that each system is used at a particular time, and
for a particular purpose. I don’t believe this is an accident. It is an
outcome of the fact that the structure of symbol systems constrains
the message/information that it can encode (Goodman and Elgin,
1988). This tight coupling between the structure of symbol systems
and informational content also implies that internal and external
symbol systems must share similar properties to encode similar
information.
In addition to the nature of the representations, there are
the cognitive transformations to consider. The initial transfor-
mations, particularly from the design brief to the preliminary
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org April 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 241 | 6
Goel Creative brains: designing in the real world
FIGURE 5 | An incomplete and highly speculative reconstruction of
Utzon’s problem space. One crucial key to understanding the design
problem space is to look at the nature of the several different types of
representations utilized by designers. They can be broadly divided up into
natural language, conceptual sketches, and contract documents. Design
briefs consist largely of natural language sentences. Their level of precision
and ambiguity varies. Drawings A–D are examples of early conceptual
sketches. There is often no fact of the matter as to what they represent.
The “what is that?” is often discovered and emerges after the drawing.
Drawings E and F show the development of one of the ideas introduced in
the conceptual sketches. The artifact is beginning to take a speciﬁc form
and starting to be ﬂeshed out. Drawings G and H are examples of technical
drawings or blueprints that will form part of the contract documents. They
specify the artifact in a very precise, complete, unambiguous, and
determinate manner. The differences between the conceptual sketches and
the working drawings (ostensibly both “pictorial”) are at least as great as
the differences between the design brief and the conceptual sketches. See
text.
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sketches, and among the preliminary sketches, correspond to the
above-mentioned defocused attention or divergent/lateral trans-
formation processes. Notice the relationship between the design
brief and the initial drawings. There is a very explicit process of
abstraction that occurs here. The drawings are somehow con-
nected to, but not entailed by the design brief. For example,
what in the design brief entails the connection to the Yucatán
Peninsula in Mexico that Utzon reports making (Footnote 1)?
The connections here are some form of whimsical, serendip-
itous associations (conceptual, semantic, economic, esthetic,
resemblance, etc.). Many different instantiations would be con-
sistent with the design brief, and several different ones may be
considered. Similarly, the relationships between the early con-
ceptual sketches are also associative, as opposed to inferential.
(See Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988) for a discussion of the distinc-
tion between inference and association]. As one moves through
the problem space and the drawings become more determinate,
the transformations begin to correspond to convergent/vertical
processes, which are amenable to inference relationships. (e.g.,
if the building code requires three ﬁre doors for the design
you have developed, then you must provide three ﬁre doors. . .
You may of course try to negotiate this or reconceptualize the
design, but that just pops you up to an earlier phase in the
process).
The whole process is, of course, carried out in the context of
expert knowledge of architectural design. The use of indetermi-
nate representations and vague associations in the early explorative
phases of the design process are explicit tools used to move beyond
the borders of expert preconceptions. Technical knowledge and
skill is more prevalent in the more constrained, latter half of the
process.
A formal and more complete discussion of the struc-
ture of the symbol systems used by designers and how they
facilitate design problem-solving is offered elsewhere (Goel,
1995). For present purposes the main point is that real-
world design problem-solving requires at least two different
types of transformation processes, variously referred to as
divergent/lateral and convergent/vertical transformations. The
former broaden the problem space while the latter deepen
it. Both are necessary. These two different types of transfor-
mations are facilitated by different types of representations.
While there are several differences in the various representa-
tions used by designers (see Goel, 1995), in the above dis-
cussion I have focused on one such difference: the variability
along the dimension of determinacy. Divergent thinking pro-
cesses are deﬁned over largely indeterminate representations
while convergent thinking processes beneﬁt from determinate
representations.
An important outcome of the more complete, formal analysis is
that indeterminate representations, while necessary for real-world
problem solving, are inconsistent with standard information pro-
cessing theory models of problem-solving (Goel, 1995). A dual
mechanism model of real-world problem-solving is required. One
component of this model can be captured by standard informa-
tion processing theory accounts (Newell and Simon, 1972; Newell,
1990). The other component requires a different type of mecha-
nism, perhaps something akin to the “subsymbolic”/associative
models (Smolensky, 1988). Both mechanisms are required to
account for real-world problem solving, such as design. In the
next section I review neuropsychological evidence supporting this
position.
BRAIN SYSTEMS INVOLVED IN DESIGNING ARTIFACTS
FRONTAL LOBE LATERALIZATION HYPOTHESIS
I have argued for a dual mechanism cognitive account of real-
world problem-solving. The question now is whether there is
any support for such a model at the neuropsychological level.
I will suggest that there is evidence for anatomical dissociations
corresponding to the cognitive dissociations identiﬁed in the pre-
vious section. To this end I propose the Frontal Lobe Lateralization
Hypothesis (FLLH).
FLLH: Left and right prefrontal cortex make differential contributions
(in terms of the structure of representations and types of transforma-
tions) to real-world problem solving. The right PFC supports abstract,
vague, ambiguous, indeterminate representations of the world, while
the left PFC abhors uncertainty and tries to automatically ﬁll in the
gaps with concrete, determinate, unambiguous, speciﬁc information.
The system is set up in such a way that each hemisphere also tries
to inhibit the other, though usually the left dominates (see below).
Successful functioning in the real world is a judicious balancing act
between these two systems. Damage to either system will result in
impaired real-world performance, but with different cognitive signa-
tures. Damage to right PFC system will allow the left PFC free reign
to prematurely lock on to patterns and solutions; drawing conclusions
quickly and conﬁdently, often to the detriment of the patient. Damage
to the left PFC will allow the right PFC system – which supports the
encoding and processing of ill-structured representations that facilitate
lateral transformations – to have more impact. If the right PFC system
remains totally unchecked, one would expect these patients (with left
PFC lesions) to have enormous difﬁculty in articulating details and
arriving at decisions.
The FLLH is not unrelated to ideas advanced by Beeman (1993)
and Goldberg (2001). Beeman (1993) has developed a notion
of coarse coding and ﬁne coding of linguistic representations in
the right and left hemispheres, respectively. Goldberg (2001) dif-
ferentiates between left and right prefrontal cortex in terms of
processing routine information (left PFC) and novel information
(right PFC).
EVIDENCE FOR LEFT PFC SYSTEM
Research with split-brain patients provides considerable evidence
for the left hemisphere component of this hypothesis (Gazzaniga
and Smylie, 1984; Gazzaniga, 1998, 2000). In one classic exper-
iment (Gazzaniga, 1998), a split brain patient was presented
with a picture of a winter scene projected to the right hemi-
sphere (i.e., left visual ﬁeld) and a picture of a chicken claw
projected to the left hemisphere (i.e., right visual ﬁeld). The
patient must then select two related pictures, one picture with
each hand, from an array of other pictures. The patient’s left
hand points to a shovel (because the right-hemisphere, control-
ling that hand has seen a snow-covered winter scene) and the
right-hand points to a chicken (because the left hemisphere, con-
trolling that hand, has seen the chicken claw). When the patient
is asked to explain why his left hand (guided by the RH) is point-
ing to the shovel, the left hemisphere (dominant for language)
has no access to the information about the winter scene seen
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by the RH. But instead of responding “I don’t know” he responds
by noting that the shovel is required to clean the chicken coop.
These and similar ﬁndings have led Gazzaniga (1998, 2000) to
postulate the existence of a “left hemisphere interpreter,” a pattern
completion system that is compelled to connect bits of incomplete
information and make sense of the world. It cannot tolerate inde-
terminacy or uncertainty. It must make connections, even though
premature and ﬂawed. This split-brain patient literature, however,
limits the role of the RH to little more than visual organization
(Corballis, 2003).
Gazzaniga’s (1998, 2000) conclusion about the dominance and
role of the left hemisphere interpreter has been reinforcedby recent
neuroimaging studies showing strong left PFC involvement in
a range of cognitive processes including hypothesis generation
(Wolford et al., 2000), deductive reasoning (Goel, 2007; Prado
et al., 2011), inductive reasoning (Goel and Dolan, 2004; Rever-
beri et al., 2005), and decision-making (DeNeys and Goel, 2011).
In some of these tasks, such as deductive reasoning, the argu-
ment are determinant (though see below) and the conclusion are
entailed by the premises. In the inductive reasoning tasks,while the
argument itself is indeterminate, participants automatically make
assumptions to eliminate the indeterminacy (as in the chicken claw
and shovel example above).
EVIDENCE FOR RIGHT PFC SYSTEM
Data supporting an extended role of the right PFC are harder
to come by, largely because most neuropsychological tasks are
well-structured and thus minimize the engagement of this sys-
tem. But based on recent studies, I want to suggest that right
PFC plays a critical but selective role in situations where the prob-
lem space (a) is very broad and poorly constrained, (b) contains
misleading/conﬂicting information, and (c) contains insufﬁcient
information to determine the conclusion. These are all hallmarks
of real-world problems.
One can get a glimpse of this role of right PFC even in well-
structured tasks. For example, broadening the search space on
scrambled word tasks by widening semantic categories words can
belong to (e.g., “make the word ‘knife’ with IKFEN”; to “make a
word for a kitchen utensil with IKFEN”; to “make a word with
IKFEN”) reduces task constraints, broadens the problem space,
and selectively engages right PFC (Vartanian and Goel, 2005).
Even in a classic “left hemisphere” task like logical reasoning,
where participants are presented with transitive arguments (e.g.,
Mary is taller than John; John is taller than Angie; Mary is taller
thanAngie) andmust determine if the conclusion follows from the
premises, a recent study shows that patients with left PFC lesions
are selectively impaired in trials with complete information (i.e.,
determinate trials; e.g., A > B, B > C, A > C and A > B, B > C,
C > A), while patients with right PFC lesions were selectively
impaired in trialswith incomplete information (i.e., indeterminate
trials; A > B, A > C, B > C; Goel et al., 2007). This patient study
demonstrates a double dissociation across the two hemispheres
along the dimension of determinacy, and provides strong evidence
for the hypothesis. Neuroimaging studies reveal similar results
(Goel et al., 2009; Brzezicka et al., 2011).
There are also data on “defocused attention” tasks from the
cognitive creativity literature. A number of brain imaging studies
do report RH involvement (either prefrontal cortex or supe-
rior temporal gyrus; Jung-Beeman et al., 2004; Kounios et al.,
2008; Kounios and Beeman, 2010). However, the results across
numerous studies do vary. A number of studies show bilat-
eral frontal lobe involvement (Kounios et al., 2006; Aziz-Zadeh
et al., 2009), while at least one highlights left PFC involvement
(Luo et al., 2004). I suspect the variable results are a function of
the varying task requirements across studies. The bilateral PFC
results are not inconsistent with the frontal lobe lateralization
hypothesis. The claim is not that one or the other hemisphere
is required for a particular task, but that participation of the
right PFC is necessary to successfully deal with ill-structured
situations. This does not preclude the participation of the
left PFC.
It is challenging to carry out experimental studies with ill-
structured problems, and even more so within the constraints of
brain imaging paradigms. Nonetheless, there are several attempts
within the literature. Kowatari et al. (2009) carried out an fMRI
study in which novice and experienced designers were asked to
“think about new designs” for pens. The outputs were evaluated
on a “good design award criteria” scale. Their main ﬁnding was
that the design task involved activation in right inferior frontal
gyrus, right inferior parietal cortices, bilateral inferior tempo-
ral cortices, and bilateral hippocampus. A comparison of left
and right hemisphere activation revealed that the right PFC and
parietal cortex showed signiﬁcantly greater activation then left
PFC and parietal cortex, particularly in the experts. Furthermore,
they carried out a correlational analysis between individual orig-
inality scores (based on a “good design award criteria”) and the
BOLD signal changes and found a signiﬁcant correlation between
the originality scores and the left minus right PFC BOLD sig-
nal, but not with right PFC or left PFC BOLD signals per se.
This intriguing ﬁnding supports our contention that interac-
tion between left and right PFC may be critical for good design
solutions.
Ellamil et al. (2011) had university graphic design students
engage in generate and evaluate cycles of book cover illustration
design. These participants would have had considerable domain
speciﬁc knowledge about graphic design. They were given ver-
bal descriptions of books and allowed 30 s to generate an idea
on a graphic tablet and 20 s to evaluate it, while undergoing
fMRI scanning. They report that creative generation was asso-
ciated with recruitment of medial temporal lobe regions while
creative evaluation was associated with bilateral prefrontal and
posterior regions. They suggest the following explanation as to
why their task did not activate right prefrontal cortex in the gen-
eration condition: “the preferential recruitment of the medial
temporal lobe during generation in the present study suggests
that the participants, who were highly skilled art students exer-
cising their abilities in a familiar task, may have generated ideas
without the need for set shifting or dramatic conceptual reor-
ganization, thus not requiring right PFC involvement.” Thus,
while not supportive of the FLLH, these results are not necessarily
inconsistent.
Perhaps the most directly relevant neuroimaging study to our
topic is the architectural design task by Gilbert et al. (2009). This
study used a clever task involving a plan drawing of a conference
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room (with a door, two windows, and a screen on one wall) and
plan drawings of tables and chairs placed outside the room. There
were two tasks. In the ﬁrst, non-design problem-solving task, nor-
mal healthy individuals were asked to arrange the furniture in the
room such that the following ﬁve constraints were satisﬁed: “(i)
the two tables face each other; (ii) the long table is parallel to the
screen; (iii) the participants can see each other; (iv) one partic-
ipant cannot see the screen; (v) all the furniture is used.” In the
second version of the task (the design task) the drawing stimuli
were the same but the participants were asked to organize the
tables and chairs in the conference room so that: “(i) the room
is spacious; (ii) the room enables collaboration; (iii) the partici-
pants can see each other; (iv) all participants can see the screen;
(v) you may use any of the furniture you like”. The second task
involves greater degrees of freedom and interpretation than the
ﬁrst task and captures some of the interesting differences between
well-structured and ill-structured problems discussed above. Par-
ticipants indicated their solutions by moving and positioning the
furniture pieces using a trackball system. They took on average
longer to complete the design task (36 s) than the non-design
task (31.8 s). The main result of the study was that the design
condition was associated with greater activity in right dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex compared to the non-design condition. A similar
conclusion was reached in the two patient studies discussed below.
About 15 years ago I had the rare opportunity to test an
accomplished, Yale educated, architect (Patient PF) who had the
misfortune of suffering a right frontal parasagittal meningioma
(Goel and Grafman, 2000). When I met PF he was bright, intelli-
gent, and extremely articulate. Despite the pathology, his IQ and
memory scores remained in the excellent range. But despite this,
his personal and professional life had fallen apart and he found
himself back living at home with his mother in his mid-50s. Since
hewas an architect we set him the task of redesigning our lab space.
We asked another age and education matched professional archi-
tect to act as the control. A verbal protocol analysis methodology
was employed (Ericsson and Simon, 1993).
Figure 6 depicts the solution space of the normal control sub-
ject. There are nine states including, a start state (A,B), a goal
state (J) and seven intermediate states (C–I). The starting state
is drawing (A) of the existing lab space and the accompany-
ing measurement drawing (B). Three of the intermediate states
belong to the preliminary design phase (C–E); four belong to
the reﬁnement phase (F–I); and the ﬁnal state belongs to detail-
ing (J). The preliminary design states are all quite abstract. He
is not transforming walls and furniture. He begins by consider-
ing “circulation patterns” in drawing (C). This pattern constitutes
his kernel idea. It is developed and transformed to deal with the
issues of “social organization” (D) and “permanent and transient
FIGURE 6 | Control subject’s state space and transformation functions. DrawingsA and B constitute the problem start state. The drawings I and J
constitute the ﬁnal (goal) state. Drawings C through G constitute the intermediate states. LT indicates a lateral transformation. VT indicates a vertical
transformation. See text.
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spaces” (E). The reﬁnement drawings are structural. They depict
concrete objects such as workstations, tables, doors, windows,
and corridors. He transforms state (E) into a proposal (F; half
way during the session) that he considers “reasonable.” However,
he thinks the center condition can be improved. He therefore
holds the perimeter conditions constant and transforms the cen-
ter in drawing (H). He rejects drawing (H), returns to drawing
(F) and transforms it into drawing (G). He is happy with the
idea depicted by drawing (G). He now shifts gear and begins to
detail and ﬁne tune the proposal, ﬁrst in section (I) and then in
plan (J).
The movement from states (C) to (G) is underwritten by lateral
transformations. The movement of states (G) to (I) and from (I)
to (J) is underwritten by vertical transformation.
An analysis of the patient’s state space tells a very different story.
There are ﬁve states in the patient’s solution space (Figure 7), a
start state (A), a goal state (E) and three intermediate states (B–D).
The start state drawing of the existing lab space (A) was com-
pleted by the patient from memory in the testing room. It is as
detailed and accurate as the control’s drawing. The patient’s ﬁnal
state drawing (E) was completed during the reﬁnement phase.
The three intermediate drawings (B–D) were completed during
the preliminary design phase. The ﬁrst of these drawings (C)
– the kernel idea – occurs two-thirds of the way into the ses-
sion. Unlike the control subject, the patient is concerned with
arranging furniture right from the start. But perhaps the most
dramatic difference between the patient and control is that the
patient’s three preliminary design drawings are fragmentary and
unrelated.
Preliminary design sketches are, almost by deﬁnition, frag-
ments of ideas. Designers do not typically generate several
independent fragments and choose between them. They gen-
erate a single idea/fragment and develop it through transfor-
mations (lateral or vertical) to a point where it is complete
and can be evaluated (Goel, 1995). The patient has made
several (successful) attempts to generate idea fragments. But
he is unable to develop and explore these ideas through the
application of lateral transformations. Each of his prelimi-
nary drawings must be treated as independent idea/fragments.
Indeed, he tries to articulate the difﬁculty he is experiencing as
follows:
“You see, normally, what I would have, even as a student, I’d
be – there would be sketches on top of sketches. And I could –
it would be progressive. Here I seem to be doing several different
thoughts on the same piece of paper in the same place, and it’s
confusing me. So, instead of the one direction that I had at the
beginning, I have three or four contradictory directions with not
a kind of anchor to work from....”
The examination and testing of this patient suggested that he
was unable to engage in lateral transformations because the rep-
resentations utilized were too concrete and precise too early in the
process. He could not abstract away from the particulars to con-
sider the problem at a more abstract level. This is consistent with
the claim that lesions to right prefrontal cortex may selectively
impair patients’ abilities to manipulate abstract, indeterminate
representations.
Design typically involves the speciﬁcation of an artifact. Plan-
ning typically involves the speciﬁcation of a sequence of actions.
FIGURE 7 | Patient’s state space and transformation functions. LT = lateral transformation; VT = vertical transformation. Drawings B–E were executed on
transparent tracing paper on top of drawingA. Reproduced from Goel and Grafman (2000).
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While planning and design are not identical they do overlap signif-
icantly at the cognitive level (Goel and Pirolli, 1989, 1992). Thus
in another study we have used a Travel Planning Task to test the
performance of patients with focal lesions to either left or right
prefrontal cortex and posterior cortex, with that of normal con-
trols (Goel et al., 2013). The advantage of such a task is that it does
not require specialized knowledge. We all have some experience
traveling and planning trips.
The task involved generating a plan for an American couple
to spend a 1 week vacation in Italy. (The participants were Ital-
ian.) The task was constrained by time (1 week vacation), a budget
($3500), and differing interests of the couple. The participants
were neurological patients with focal lesions to right prefrontal
cortex, left prefrontal cortex, and posterior cortex. Theywere given
awritten problem statement followed by a pamphlet containing all
the relevant information necessary for planning a trip, including a
list of interests, ﬂights, trains, car rental, accommodations, restau-
rants, attractions, maps, and distances between cities. They were
encouraged to ask questions if any aspect of the task was unclear.
The experimenter responded on behalf of the couple.
The task was administered in two parts, with no time restric-
tions. The ﬁrst part required participants to read through the
problem statement and the pamphlet and to complete a ques-
tionnaire designed to determine if they had understood the
problem/task and were able to navigate through the infor-
mation. If they were not able to answer the questions cor-
rectly, the experimenter helped them ﬁnd the answers. This
ensured that all participants had a similar level of under-
standing of the task before starting the actual planning phase.
During the planning phase the participants were provided
with blank paper and a diary divided into 7 days. They
were requested to develop a daily schedule of activities, tak-
ing to consideration the constraints of time, interests, and
money. The task was videotaped and participants were asked
to “talk out loud” as they did the task (Ericsson and Simon,
1993).
It was found that patients with lesions to right prefrontal cor-
tex generated substandard solutions compared to both normal
controls and patients with lesions to left prefrontal cortex and
posterior cortex. Examination of the underlying cognitive pro-
cesses and strategies revealed that patients with lesions to right
prefrontal cortex (driven by the intact left PFC) approached the
task at an excessively precise, concrete level compared to normal
controls, and very early locked themselves into substandard solu-
tions relative to the comparison group. In contrast, the behavior
of normal controls was characterized by a judicious interplay of
concrete and abstract levels/modes of representations. Damage
to the right prefrontal system impaired the encoding and pro-
cessing of more abstract and vague representations that facilitate
lateral transformations, resulting in premature commitment to
precise concrete patterns, and hasty albeit substandard conclu-
sions (because the space of possibilities had not been properly
explored).
SUMMARIZING AND CONTEXTUALIZING THE CASE FOR FLLH
The overall pattern of these data is consistent with the frontal
lobe lateralization hypothesis. The hypothesis claims that left and
right prefrontal cortex support different types of representations
and cognitive processes. I agree with Gazzaniga (1998, 2000) that
the left PFC abhors indeterminacy and is quick to impose some
interpretation onto a situation. It is often dominant, preventing
an adequate exploration of the problem space. Such a system is
well-suited to support the precise, unambiguous, and determi-
nate symbol systems required by inferencemechanisms facilitating
vertical transformations.
I contend that the critical feature of the right PFC’s role
in the above studies is the inhibition of the left PFC and the
accommodation of abstract, indeterminate representations of the
task/situation. The former prevents the left PFC from forcing
premature (often erroneous) interpretations of the task/situation
while the latter supports associative mechanisms necessary to
facilitate lateral transformations. Successful real-world problem-
solving is a judicious balancing act between these two systems.
When one system is damaged, the other will have excessive
inﬂuence over behavior.
If this hypothesis is correct, it deepens and strengthens the case
for the two mechanism model of design problem-solving offered
above. The evidence for the nature of the left hemisphere systems
ranges from the classical split brain patient studies of Gazzaniga
(1998, 2000) and Gazzaniga and Smylie (1984) to more recent
neuroimaging studies of well structured tasks, such as logical rea-
soning (Reverberi et al., 2005; Goel, 2007; Prado et al., 2011). The
evidence for the role of the right PFC is a little bit more elusive,
but largely because neuropsychologists have traditionally focused
on well structured tasks. Nonetheless, a number of recent neu-
roimaging studies are highlighting the importance of right PFC
in tasks where constraints are relaxed and the problem space is
broadened (Vartanian and Goel, 2005). Other studies point to the
importance of RH systems in classical creativity tasks involving
“defocused attention” (Jung-Beeman et al., 2004; Kounios et al.,
2008; Kounios and Beeman, 2010). Even indeterminate trials of
deductive reasoning tasks result in robust involvement of right
PFC ( Goel et al., 2007, 2009; Brzezicka et al., 2011). Moreover,
several imaging studies speciﬁcally targeting graphic and architec-
tural design tasks activate right PFC systems (Gilbert et al., 2009;
Ellamil et al., 2011). Similarly, the two patient studies of architec-
tural design and a travel planning task also highlight the necessity
of right prefrontal cortex in successfully navigating ill-structured
components of these tasks (Goel and Grafman, 2000; Goel et al.,
2013).
The frontal lobe lateralization hypothesis give us a hemispheric
asymmetry story superﬁcially reminiscent of the left brain/right
brain accounts that generated considerable academic interest in
the 1960s and 1970s (Springer and Deutsch, 1998). These accounts
were based on various divisions such as linguistic processes versus
spatial processes, analytic versus synthetic processes, etc.. How-
ever, they have failed to survive in the academic literature because
the data simply do not support these distinctions (though these
accounts remain live and well in the popular psychology litera-
ture). The current proposal differs from the left brain/right brain
account in three very important respects: (1) the current claim
is about the differential roles of right and left prefrontal cortex
(not each hemisphere). (2) It is based on a very different distinc-
tion having to do with certainty or determinacy of information
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being processed. This is independent of the linguistic/pictorial
or analytic/synthetic accounts. (3) It is an interaction account
whereby each hemisphere inhibits the other and biases certain
types of processing. The default set up is probably a left hemi-
sphere (PFC) bias or dominance. Individual differences in the
inhibition of the left PFC may account for the relative ease or dif-
ﬁculty of engaging right PFC systems. In situations where the left
PFC is lesioned, one would expect easier inhibition of the left PFC
and more of the processing to be dominated by the right PFC.
Where the right PFC is lesioned, one would expect the left PFC to
be less inhibited and dominate the processing.
CONCLUSION
I have sketched a preliminary framework of some cognitive and
neuropsychological systems necessary to account for creativity in
artifact design. The underlying theme is that an account of creativ-
ity should emerge from an account of real-world problem-solving.
Creativity is unlikely to be a shining beacon to be discovered in
the brain. It is more likely an outcome of the cognitive processes
that allow us to engage in real-world problem solving. In terms of
advancing our understanding of these systems, the basic claim is
that a dual (ormore likely,multiple) processmodelmust be postu-
lated. The twoprocesses discussed here are associativemechanisms
(facilitating lateral transformations) and inference mechanisms
(facilitating vertical transformations), supported by indeterminate
and determinate representations, respectively.
This account places a great deal of emphasis on the nature of
the symbol systems that designers (in particular, architects) uti-
lize, and the sequence inwhich they utilize them. An analysis of the
symbol systems identiﬁes determinacy as one critical dimension
of variability and allows us to draw inferences about the nature
of the cognitive machinery necessary to process them. We then
appeal to the neuropsychological literature and argue that there
are neuropsychological dissociations corresponding to the cogni-
tive dissociations. This gives us a story connecting pre-theoretical
intuitions about design activity, with cognitive theory and neu-
ropsychological ﬁndings. The story is tentative, supported by some
data, but subject to change and falsiﬁcation as additional data are
collected.
In terms of the question posed by the editor of this volume,
“what if anything can neuroscience contribute to our under-
standing of creativity,” I think the answer is that, on its own,
neuroscience’s current contribution must be modest and lim-
ited. However, in conjunction with cognitive theory, it has greater
scope (Shallice and Copper, 2011). Most cognitive psychologists
are happy to have cognitive theory inform neuropsychological
research. So cognitive theory and data on real-world problem
solving have taken neuropsychology beyond the left hemisphere
interpreter and provided more realistic accounts of right PFC
processes. However, the reverse interaction is less frequently appre-
ciated. We must be equally ready to modify cognitive theory in
light of neuropsychological data, in particular, data regarding
double dissociations6. Recurrent patterns of double dissociation
6Dissociation of brain functions: Brain lesions result in selective impairment of
behavior. Such selective impairments are called dissociations. A single dissociation
occurs when we ﬁnd a case of a lesion in region x resulting in a deﬁcit of function a
are indicative of causal joints in the cognitive system invisible in
uninterrupted normal behavioral measures (Shallice, 1988). For
example, the double dissociations along the lines of determi-
nate (left PFC) and indeterminate (right PFC) representations
(Goel et al., 2007), suggests that cognitive theory needs to be
revised. The single process unitary models of human problem
solving, whether they be the traditional information processing
theorymodels (Newell,1990) or the associative/subsymbolicmod-
els (Smolensky, 1988) must be reconsidered and replaced by dual
or multiple mechanism models in light of the dissociations results.
Such genuine, two-way interaction between cognitive psychology
and neuropsychology will take us some way toward understanding
human creativity and design problem solving.
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